Why Splinternet Never Makes Practical Sense

General access to the internet was never a given. The first batch of software many of us encountered was an assortment of disembodied programs with names like Archie and Fetch. The ascension of all-in-one tools like Mosaic and Netscape Navigator helped make sense of the chaotic early days of the World Wide Web.

Wikipedia describes the Web as “a global collection of documents and other resources, linked by hyperlinks and URIs (Uniform Resource Identifiers).” But for various reasons, various factions want to splinter off from the global data stream. The phrase “splinternet” has gained traction recently due to strife in Eastern Europe.

“The splinternet (also referred to as cyber-balkanization or internet balkanization) is a characterization of the Internet as splintering and dividing due to various factors,” says Wikipedia. These factors include technology, commerce, politics, nationalism, religion, and divergent national interests.

“The Chinese government erected the 'Great Firewall' for political reasons,” says Wikipedia, “and Russia has enacted the Sovereign Internet Law that allows it to partition itself from the rest of the Internet.” The Russian law cited went into effect in 2019 and “tightens Moscow’s control over the country’s internet infrastructure and aims to provide a way for Russia to disconnect its networks from the rest of the world,” according to CNBC.

CNBC also notes that “Experts doubt whether such a move is technically possible.”

Deep packets

“In 2013, then-Brazilian president Dilma Rouseff called on countries in the U.N. to build their own sovereign internet government structures,” says a 2021 feature on The Register. “North Korea has Kwangmyong, a centrally administered network accessible only via a heavily monitored Linux distro called Red Star. Cuba has RedCubana, an alternative to the open net that houses Cuban versions of popular websites like Wikipedia, along with local apps. Iran has its National Information Network (a.k.a. the Halal internet), a government-controlled network that hosts Iranian sites and tracks all its users.”

Fettering access to the internet appeals to specific regimes. But what are the realities of such a situation?

“The law...obliges internet service providers to install special equipment that can track, filter, and reroute internet traffic,” says a blog post on Human Rights Watch. “This equipment allows Russia’s telecommunications watchdog, Roskomnadzor, to independently and extrajudicially block access to content that the government deems a threat.”

Fettering access to the internet appeals to specific regimes

“The equipment that internet service providers are required to install will conduct Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), an advanced method of network monitoring that can be used to block or surveil internet traffic,” says the HRW blog post. The use of DPI is far from transparent. “In addition to using DPI for the security of their own networks, governments in North America, Europe, and Asia use DPI for various purposes such as surveillance and censorship,” says Wikipedia. “Many of these programs are classified.”

NB: the U.S. mandates DPI. “The FCC, pursuant to its mandate from the U.S. Congress, and in line with the policies of most countries worldwide, has required that all telecommunication providers, including Internet services, be capable of supporting the execution of a court order to provide real-time communication forensics of specified users,” says Wikipedia. “In 2006, the FCC adopted new Title 47, Subpart Z, rules requiring Internet Access Providers to meet these requirements. DPI was one of the platforms essential to meeting this requirement and has been deployed for this purpose throughout the U.S.”

Splinter factions, no TLD sanctions

The vicissitudes of warfare curved once again earlier this month when Ukraine petitioned ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) to scrub a few TLDs (Top Level Domains) from the global internet and “to shut down DNS root servers in Russia and revoke Russian domains such as .ru, .рф, and .su,” according to ArsTechnica.

The petition letter was sent by Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine's vice prime minister and minister of digital transformation, to ICANN and other agencies, including Bill Woodcock, executive director of international nonprofit Packet Clearing House, posted the text on Pastebin. Woodcock told ArsTechnica: “As a critical infrastructure operator, my inclination is to say 'heck no' regardless of my sympathies."

The vicissitudes of warfare curved once again earlier this month

“Our mission does not extend to taking punitive actions, issuing sanctions, or restricting access against segments of the Internet — regardless of the provocations,” wrote Göran Marby, president and chief executive officer at ICANN, in response to Fedorov. “ICANN applies its policies consistently and in alignment with documented processes. To make unilateral changes would erode trust in the multistakeholder model and the policies designed to sustain global Internet interoperability.”

Do not splinter

Global connectivity brings rewards but often causes concern, sometimes at the nation-state level. So what should CDOs take away from the concept of the “splinternet”?

First and foremost, CDOs must examine their cybersecurity strategy. Consult a security professional if in doubt. Should you consider penetration testing?

An examination of any organization's protocols will show no security advantage for a reduced-access internet. This is not an effective measure for professionals seeking to reduce their attack surface.

Stefan Hammond is a contributing editor to CDOTrends. Best practices, the IOT, payment gateways, robotics and the ongoing battle against cyberpirates pique his interest. You can reach him at [email protected].

Image credit: iStockphoto/gustavofrazao